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WARSAW FROM THE FRENCH
PERSPECTIVE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
LIABILITY LIMITS UNDER
THE WARSAW CONVENTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Warsaw Convention, now over 45 years old, was originally
designed to aid the growth of a new, undeveloped, and somewhat
perplexing commercial enterprise-the international air transportation industry. Unfortunately, the drafters of the Convention took
a narrow, and perhaps ill-advised, view of regulation of liability.
They limited the carriers' liability for damage to an amount that
could easily have been foreseen to be unworkable and they defined
the concept of fault in ambiguous terms. While this fledgling attempt to codify an area of private international law was meant to
provide a uniformity of terms that would be workable in a variety
of legal systems, the result has been an increasing breakdown of
the Convention's concepts in the courts of the ratifying states.
This note will analyze one of the inadequacies of the Warsaw
Convention-the limitation of liability for passenger injury-on a
comparative basis. The analysis will first give a brief historical
background of the Warsaw Convention. Second, the basic nature
of French tort concepts in relation to carrier liability and the specific application of those concepts to airline cases in France will be
discussed. Finally, a brief overview of the standards employed in
England, Germany, and the Soviet Union will be given.
I1.

A.

THE WARSAW CONVENTION

HistoricalBackground

The Warsaw Convention' was concluded in 1929 by representatives of the "air nations" of the world.2 Called "[o]ne of the major
achievements in the international unification of rules of private
law,"' 3 it was one of the first multinational agreements to impose
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.

No. 87, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
2. Note, The Warsaw Convention: A New Look at Jurisdictionunder Articles
17 and 28 and the Problem of Manufacturers'Liability, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251,
252 (1976). See also 2 J. KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES, ch.
7 at 4-5 (1968).

3.

Cheng &Austin, Air Law, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND
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uniform limits on the liability of air carriers, lending aspects of
predictability and certainty to the risks these carriers faced.4 Chief
among the innovations of the Warsaw Convention was the contractualization of the passenger-carrier relationship,5 the imposition of
a monetary limit on passenger recovery for injuries,6 and a precise
definition of the jurisdictional limits on suits against an airline.7
While there has been some discussion as to whether the United
States ratification of the Convention was legal,' the treaty nevertheless became federal law in 1934.1 England ratified the treaty
and made it into law in 1932, France and Germany in 1933, and
the Soviet Union in 1934.10
The greatest weakness in the Warsaw Convention appears to be
the liability ceiling established in article 22. The limit was originally set at 125,000 Poincar6 gold francs, which was approximately
U.S. $8,300.00.11 Linking the liability limit to the price of gold was
an attempt to account for the rise in cost of living.12 As this proved
insufficient in the face of rapidly rising costs, however, courts
began to loosely interpret other terms of the Convention in order
to compensate injury more adequately.13
As a result of these difficulties, the Hague Protocol, the product
of ten years' work by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), was concluded on September 20, 1955.14 The Protocol included three important provisions: it doubled the liability limit to
$16,000; it authorized the award of litigation costs and fees; and it
OTHER ESSAYS 183, 186 (M. Bos ed. 1973).
4. Note, supra note 2, at 251.
5. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3. See also H. DRIoN, LIIrrATION OF
LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 3 (1954).

6. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22. See generally, Rosman v. Trans
World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
7. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1). See also Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 624 (1967).
8. See Kennelly, Aviation Law: InternationalAir Travel-A Brief Diagnosis
and Prognosis, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 86 (1975).
9. 49 Stat. 3000 (1934). The official text is in French, the English text is to
be found at 49 Stat. 3014 (1934).
10. See 2 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, Am LAw (3d ed. P. Kennan, A. Lester
& P. Martin 1975) app. A at 5, 6, 8B.
11. Cheng & Austin, supra note 3, at 186; Comment, Legal Problems in Compensation under the Gold Clauses of PrivateInternationalLaw Agreements, 63
GEo. L. J. 817, 818 (1975).
12. Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law
Conventions, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 718, 719 (1972).
13. Cheng & Austin, supra note 3, at 187.
14. The Hague Protocol, September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371.
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to impose absolute
amended article 25 of the Warsaw Convention
5
liability for intentional or reckless harm.'
The text of the Protocol was not transmitted to the United
States Senate until 1959, and the hearings on ratification did not
begin until 1965, ten years after the Protocol was opened for signature.'6 By that time, despite suggestions to supplement recovery
with legislatively-provided insurance, the higher liability limit
contained in the Protocol did not provide adequate compensation
to United States passengers." Though many nations did ratify the
Protocol, the United States did not. The Protocol does apply, however, to United States citizens who are passengers on flights originating and terminating in countries which are signatories to the
Protocol.'
The rejection of the Hague Protocol in the Senate resulted in
even greater dissatisfaction in the United States with the Warsaw
Convention liability limits. On November 15, 1965, the Department of State gave formal notice of withdrawal from the Convention itself, to be effective in May 1966.' 9 The United States courts
supported this stance by refusing to apply the Convention's provisions on practically implausible grounds." The ICAO held a special meeting of Warsaw signatories in February 1966 to negotiate
higher liability limits but the discussions failed.2 ' Through the
efforts of prominent members of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), the international airlines themselves then
15. Boyle, The Guatemala Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, 6 CAL. W.
41, 43-44 (1975).
16. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497 (1967).
17. Boyle, supra note 15, at 44-45.
18. Welner, The ContinuingAttacks by American Courts on the Warsaw
Convention, 4 INT'L L. 915 (1970). There must be no agreed stopping place in the
United States during the flight, however. See Cheng & Austin, supra note 3, at
190-91.
19. 53 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 923 (1965). In the years after the Hague Protocol,
the United States proposed increasingly higher liability limits. Other governments regarded the need for higher liability limits as a problem for which the
United States should seek its own solution. See Cheng & Austin, supra note 3, at
187.
20. See Lisi v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 253 F. Supp. 237
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), affl'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968), reh. denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968). The court of appeals
simply disregarded the Warsaw Convention because of the small print on the
ticket. 370 F.2d at 513-14. The dissent charged that the majority was re-writing
the Convention by "judicial flat." Id. at 515.
21. Cheng & Austin, supra note 3, at 188.
INT'L L.J.
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began to look for a solution to the problem. The result was a voluntary special contract, called the Montreal Agreement, in which all
air carriers operating to and from the United States bound themselves, in contravention of article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention,
to accept a liability limit of $75,000 and absolute liability for passenger injury.22 The Agreement is applicable only to carriage under
the Convention that includes a point of origin, a point of destination, or an agreed stopping place in the United States. 3 The Civil
Aeronautics Board approved the Agreement on May 13, 1966,24 and
the denunciation of the Convention was simultaneously withdrawn.2
The Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 constituted a further effort
to modify the Warsaw Convention. 2 This document was formulated at a diplomatic conference attended by many of the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and thus, unlike the Montreal
Agreement, has international legal effect where ratified. It incorporated the principle of absolute liability by providing that a carrier
is liable for passenger injury "upon condition only" that the tortious event took place on board the aircraft or during embarking
or disembarking. 7 The defense of contributory negligence was retained, 2 and the liability ceiling was raised to 1,500,000 gold
francs.2 9 The Protocol also allows parties to adopt "domestic supplements" which would provide additional compensation beyond
Convention limits to victims of international air accidents. Although the proposals in this Protocol have been well received in the
United States, 3' the United States has not ratified the Protocol.
22, Boyle, supra note 15, at 47. See Cheng & Austin, supra note 3, at 189.
23, See The Warsaw Convention-Recent Developments and the Withdrawal
of the United States Denunciation,32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243, 248 (1966) (Dep't of
State press release).
24. C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
25. C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, supra note 24.
26, Guatemala City Protocol, March 8, 1971, reprintedin A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 437 (1972). For a discussion of United States negotiations and strategy,

see Boyle, supra note 15, at 49.56.
27.

Guatemala City Protocol, art. 4, reprintedin A. LOWENFELD supra note 26,

at 438.

28. Id. art. 7, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 26, at 439.

29. Id. art. 8, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 26, at 440. As of 1973
this figure represented US $120,000.

30. For an explanation of this plan, see Fitzgerald, The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the Warsaw Convention Regime GoverningInternationalCarriage

by Air, 42 J. AIR L. & CoM. 273, 279 & nn.17-21 (1976).
31. See id. It has been suggested that the United States ratification of the

WARSAW CONVENTION
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B.

The Modern Perspective

Written primarily to support an infant industry and providing
a level of monetary recovery for injury that is no longer reasonable,
the Warsaw Convention is, in 1978, somewhat of an anomaly. It
should be noted that the Convention's regulation of baggage, ticketing, and air shipping, while not within the scope of this analysis,
is also outdated, and the provisions covering 32these areas have also
been subject to frequent attack and revision.
Extensive revisions and amendments3 3 to the Convention attest
to the inflexibility of its scope as originally drafted. The basic
difficulty is evidenced by the discrimination between the rights of
passengers resulting from the different "levels" at which nations
have adhered to the Convention. The Convention and the Hague
Protocol apply only to travel between those ticketed nations of
origin and destination that have ratified either or both treaties,
while the Montreal Agreement applies to air travel that has a
"contact" with the United States. Thus, any one of three results
can be reached. A passenger on a flight from London to Iran, for
example, would not be limited in his recovery because Iran, the
state of destination, is not a party to the Warsaw Convention. A
passenger on a flight from Italy to Greece would be limited, however, to a $16,000 recovery because both origin and destination
states ratified the Hague Protocol. If that same passenger had
started his journey in New York, he could recover up to $75,000
because his flight would be governed by the Montreal Agreement.
The Warsaw Convention continues to be the basis for the international regulation of air travel, but no analysis of the Convention
could proceed without mentioning the difficulties currently undermining many of its provisions. If the Convention was indeed aimed
at providing a just and uniform scheme of recovery for injuries
sustained in international aviation, its achievements in this regard
Guatemala Protocol would really entail acceptance of the Hague Protocol. See
Boyle, supra note 15, at 56-57.
32. See Fitzgerald, supra note 30.
33. Revisions include not only the Hague Protocol, the Montreal Agreement,

and the Guatemala City Protocol, but also other documents relating to highjacking and international charter. The latter include: (1) the Hague Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 2 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective Oct. 14, 1971); (2) The Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,
1 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (effective Jan. 26, 1973); (3) The Guadalajara
Convention of 1961, Int'l Civ. Av. Org. Doc. No. 8181 (1961). See also Fitzgerald,
supra note 30.
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are questionable. However, the prospect of revision of the treaty
should encourage continuing analyses.
III.

FRENCH LAW AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION

A.

French Tort Concepts

French law is often characterized as "written law." It is the basis
of the civil law system in which legal principles are codified and
the actual development of the law depends not on precedent, as
in the common law, but on the cumulative effect of interpretations
of statutes. 3 French judicial decisions always cite articles from the
appropriate code as support for holdings. The codes are broadly
worded, stating basic rules rather than specific, factual commands. This generality facilitates the dependence of French law on
statutory provisions. Legal rules are found in the statutes themselves, not in the application of rules to particular facts. Seemingly
correspondent terms contained in the English and French texts of
a treaty, therefore, may not in fact be equivalent because the common law derives the meaning of the term from a line of cases while
the civil law codifies and defines the term first, then lets case
holdings develop from it.35 The primary purpose of codification in
France is to unify the law nationally, simplify it, and eliminate
practical problems. 6
The French law of torts is founded on the judicial application of
five provisions in the Civil Code, articles 1382 through 1386. The
most important and broadly stated is article 1382, which provides
that any one person has an obligation to make good the damage
that he has caused another.3 7 Article 1382 governs unintentional
harm by providing that everyone is responsible not only for intentional damage but also for any damage caused by his negligence
or carelessness.3 8 The next three articles apply respectively to vi34. C. Civ. art. 5 (Fr. 1975); see generally Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine, and Precedent in FrenchLaw, 18 LA. L.
REV. 235, 256 (1958).
35. See generally R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND
METHODOLOGY 81 (1972).
36. Id. at 11-12.
37. "Every act whatever of human agency which causes damage to another
obliges the person by whose fault that damage has occurred to repair it." C. Civ.
art. 1382 (Fr. 1975) (translation by the author). For an unofficial translation of
the French Civil Code see J. CRASS, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (1977).

38. "Each person is liable for the damage that he has caused not only by his
actions, but also by his negligence or by his imprudence." C. CIv. art. 1383 (Fr.
1975) (translation by the author).
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carious liability, 9 liability for damage 41caused by animals," and
liability for buildings in need of repair.
Fault is a prerequisite for all liability under the concept of
"obligation." While the common law divides obligation into two
distinctareas of tort and contract, French law considers it conceptually immaterial how the obligation arose.4" Questions of damage
and causation are the same in both cases.43 To recover in tort, a
plaintiff must show that he actually suffered existing and certain
damage. French law distinguishes between material damage and
moral damage: the former encompassing any loss measurable in
terms of money, the latter encompassing mental anguish and pain
and suffering. 44 Causation must exist between the act for which the
defendant was responsible and the damage. Whether or not such
a connection exists is a question of law that is reserved for the
highest French court, the Cour de Cassation.45 French courts need
only find a slight degree of fault to impose liability" and French
law allows the defenses of intervening causation, including supervening force and accident, contributory negligence, and assump39. "One is liable not only for the damage which he causes by his own action,
but also for that damage which is caused by persons for whom he is responsible,
or by those things which he has in his keeping." C. Civ. art. 1384 (Fr. 1975)
(translation by the author). This article has been the most important source of
liability for damage caused by vehicles. Whereas the plaintiff must prove the
defendant at fault under articles 1382-1383, fault is presumed under this article,
if it applies. The presumption of fault may be rebutted only if there is strict proof
of an unavoidable and unforeseen event that could be imputed to the defendant.

H. DEVRIES,

CiviL, LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERIcAN LAWYER

320 (1976).

40. "The owner of an animal or he who avails himself of it while it is being
put to his use, is liable for the damage which the animal causes, whether the
animal was in his keeping or whether it had strayed or escaped." C. Civ. art. 1385
(Fr. 1975) translated in J. CRABB, supra note 37, at 253.
41. "The proprietor of a building is liable for the damage caused by its collapse when it has happened by the fault of upkeep or through the defect of its
construction." C. Crv. art. 1386 (Fr. 1975) (translation by the author).
42.

Crabb, Fault and Faute, 5 INTER-AM. L. REV. 151, 152 (1963).

43. Catala &Weir, Delict and Torts:A Study in Parallel,37 TuL. L. REV. 573,
576 (1963).
44. M. AMOS & F. WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 202, 209 (3d ed. F.
Lawson, A. Anton & L. Neville Brown eds. 1967). Material damage covers destruction of property, loss of profit, wages and support, and expenses. Moral
damage is effected by injury to those things outside a person's "patrimony," the
French legal concept of assets and liabilities appreciable in cash. For example,
such extrapatrimonial rights include honor, liberty and privacy. Id.
45. Id. at 211.
46. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
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tion of the risk.47 The latter two defenses are a complete bar to
recovery, however, only if the plaintiff was solely responsible for his

own injury."
B. Aviation Law in France
The French Codes are divided into specific subject areas which
cover five major fields of law: civil law, civil procedure, commerce,
criminal law, and criminal procedure." A major portion of the
Code of Civil and Commercial Aviation (Code de l'aviation civile
et commerciale), a minor code,5" is contained within the Code de
Commerce under articles concerning the general requirements for
a freight waybill.' The Code Civil also contains a statement of an
air carrier's liability concerning respondeat superior and liability
for "things within one's protection." 2
Articles 321-1, 321-4, 322-3, and 322-4 of the Code of Civil and

Commercial Aviation govern the liability of an air carrier for passenger injury. The first article simply provides that the Code de
Commerce applies to air carriers subject to the limitation of the
other provisions." Article 321-4 provides that under article 25 of
the Warsaw Convention (a carrier cannot limit his liability if injury was caused by his "wilful misconduct"), 4 the standard of
conduct shall be interpreted as "inexcusable fault." 5 Inexcusable
fault is that deliberate conduct which implies a consciousness of
the probability of damage and its reckless acceptance without a
47. H. DEVEiEs, supra note 39, at 313.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 183.
50.

1 C. SZLADrrs, GUIDE TO FOREIGN LEGAL MATERiALs 6 n.8 (1959).

51. C. COM. art. 102 (Fr. 1975).
52. C. Civ. art. 1384 (Fr. 1975) (translation by the author).
53. "Les regles du Code de commerce relatives aux transports par terre et par
eau sont applicables au transport par air sous resarve des dispositions suivantes."
Code de l'aviation civile, L. 321-1, under, C. CoM. art. 102.
54. "The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law
of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1), reprinted in A.
LOWENFELD, supra note 26, at 419.
55. "Pour l'application de l'article 25 de ladite convention, la faute consid~r~e
comme equipollente au dol est la faute inexcusable. Est inexcusable la faute
d~lib~r~e qui implique la conscience de la probabilit6 du dommage et son acceptation t~m~raire sans raison valable." Code de l'aviation civile, L. 321-4, under, C.
Com. art. 102.
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valid reason. Article 322-3 provides that the Warsaw Convention
will govern the liability of carriers of air passengers in all cases
except where the carriage is free. In such cases, the carrier's liability will not be limited under the Convention if it is proved that the
damage was caused by the carrier or his employees." The final
article provides that the head officer of the flight crew has the
statutory right to remove any passenger presenting a threat to the
security of the airplane." The aviation code article contained in
the Code Civil provides that one who uses an aircraft is strictly
liable to persons or things situated on the ground for damage
caused by the movements of the aircraft." This provision follows
the recent trend of French decisions which hold the operator of a
vehicle responsible for damage caused in its operation."
While the Code of Civil and Commercial Aviation, considered in
conjunction with the terms of the Warsaw Convention, gives an
adequate overview of air carrier liability under French law, the role
played by French courts in helping to fashion this law is noteworthy. Of particular interest in this regard is the standard of wilful
misconduct. Article 25 of the Convention caused notable confusion
after the full treaty came into effect,"0 not only in France but in
all the signatory nations. Article 25 provided that the liability limit
would not apply if passenger injury was caused by the misconduct
of the carrier or any of its agents or servants acting within the scope
56. "La responsabilit6 du transporteur de personnes est regie par les dispositions de la Convention de Varsovie comme pr~vu aux articles L. 321-3, L. 321-4 et
L. 321-5. Toutefois, sauf stipulations conventionelles contraires, la responsi-bilit6
du transporteur effectuant un transport gratuit ne sera 6ngagee dans la limite
prevue par ladite convention, que s'il est etabli que le dommage a pour cause une
faute imputable au transporteur ou a ses preposes." Code de l'aviation civile art.
L. 322-3, under, C. CoM. art. 102.
57. "Le commandant de bord a la ficult6 de d6barquer toute personne parmi
les passagers qui peut presenter un danger pour la sacurit4 ou le bon ordre Abord
d'un deronef." Code de l'aviation civile art. L. 322-4, under, C. CoM. art. 102.
58. "L'exploitant d'un deronef est responsable de plein droit des dommages
causes par les 6volutions de l'deronef ou les objets qui s'en detach6raient aux
personnes et aux biens situds d la surface."
"Cette responsabilit6 ne peut 6tre att6nu6e ou ecartee que par la preuve de la
faute de la victime." Code de l'aviation civile art. L. 141-2, under, C. Civ. art.
1384.
59. For a discussion of liability for cars and other vehicles, see H. DEVRIES,
supra note 39, at 319-34.
60. See DuPontavice, La loi du 2 mars 1957 sur la responsablite de transporteur au cas de transports deriens, 28 REVUE GiNERALE DE L'AIR 189 (1965),
reprinted in [1965] Y.B. Am & SPACE L. 335 (McGill U. Inst. Air & Space L.)
[hereinafter cited as Y.B.].
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of their employment. Judges often found such misconduct to have
occurred, in order to by-pass the liability limits and compensate
the plaintiff fully." Decisions in both civil and common law coun-.
tries differed on what constituted wilful misconduct. While German and Swiss courts found that the concept of gross negligence
sufficed," the French courts held to the concept of dol, the term
used in the official French text of the Convention and translated
in the English text as wilful misconduct. Unfortunately, dot differs
from the English term in that it implies an intention to cause
damage but does not necessarily include the elements of recklessness often associated with wilful misconduct in common law. 3 The
discrepancies in the interpretation of article 25 led, at the Hague
Conference in 1955, to its redrafting to provide that liability limits
would not apply if "damage resulted from an act . . . done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result .... ""
France anticipated the change. Spurred on by the difficulty in
applying the concept of dol and the feeling that such behavior by
an airline pilot would amount to virtual suicide, 5 the French legislature had enacted in 1957 the provisions of what is now article L.
321-4 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Aviation.68 The
"inexcusable fault" of the code provision differed from the traditional definition given the term dol by French courts, 7 but it had
the practical effect of bringing French decisions into line with the
Hague Protocol even before France ratified it in 1959.68 Article L.
321-4 has caused problems that continue in French courts. First,
the law only applied to accidents that occurred after its implementation,69 which meant recovery limits would be imposed only on the
basis of occurrence in time. Though this problem has been resolved
by the effect of statutes of limitation, there remained the question
of what is meant by the term conscience (knowledge) in the statute. The varying interpretations of this term have involved precise
analyses not only of particular fact situations, but also of tort
61. Mankiewicz, supra note 12, at 722.
62. Id. at 723.
63. Id. at 737.
64. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 26, at 429.
65. Mankiewicz, supra note 12, at 724.
66. See note 55 supra.
67. Mankiewicz, supra note 12, at 723-24.
68. The Hague Protocol entered into force in France on August 1, 1963. 2 C.
SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 10, app. A. at 5.
69. See DuPontavice, supra note 60.
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notions peculiar to civil law, and of the intent of the Hague Protocol itself.
The Cour de Cassation began in 1967 to develop an objective
standard for knowledge of the likelihood of damage. It held in
Emery v. Sabena that the fact that a pilot was unaware that his
plane was 30 miles off course did not exonerate the airline from
liability for the deaths of passengers when the plane crashed into
mountainous terrain as it attempted to land. 70 The Court found,
instead, that the crew of the plane knew that they had to stay
within a ten-mile wide airway in order to avoid both atmospheric
turbulence and the mountains, and that they should have used the
full capabilities of the radio equipment at their disposal to avoid
the danger. In Air France v. Diop, decided a year later, the Court
elaborated on the objective standard, holding that conscience
meant a presumption that the facts of the situation made it impossible for a pilot not to have been aware of the certain risks, as well
as the mere probability, of damage. 71 The pilot in Diop had attempted a landing without instruments in stormy weather, even
though he was unable to contact the radio tower, was barely able
to see the landing strip, and had sufficient fuel to keep the plane
in the air until landing conditions improved. There was also evidence that he was known for reckless behavior. In finding that
knowledge should have existed, the Cour de Cassation stated that
deliberate fault within the statute was characterized by "a persistance in confronting the foreseen risk, an obstinancy in the
72
error."
The insistence upon an objective standard has produced a conflict between the intent of the Hague Protocol, as evidenced in the
French text, and article L. 321-4. The literal translation of the
Protocol wording is "knowledge that damage will probably result
from it (the act of the carrier or its employees)." This seems to
imply that the defendant must actually know that damage can
result. If he does not have that actual knowledge, liability will be
limited. Article L. 321-4 states that the defendant must know of
the probability of damage and accept it recklessly, without a valid
70. Reported in Verplaetse, From Warsaw to the French Cour de Cassation:
Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, 36 J. Am L. & CoM. 50, 53 n.10 (1970). An
explanation of the facts can be found in the American case concerning the same
accident, Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
71. Judgment of June 24, 1968, Cass. civ. ire, France, [1968] Recueil DallozSirey, Jurisprudence[D.S. Jur.] 569, cited in Verplaetse, supra note 70, at 53.
72. Judgment of Jan. 5, 1967, Cour d'appel, Rennes, [1967] Revue Franqais
de Droit Aerien 222, summarized sub nom. Kerdranvat v. Belliard [19671 Y.B.
224.
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reason; this wording also seems to imply a need for actual knowledge. But the cases have interpreted article L. 321-4 to require only
that a defendant should have had knowledge. 3 A pilot who flew his
helicopter under cable car lines was held liable on grounds that
such a stunt implied an awareness of the risks.74 In a case that
combined the worst elements of Emery and Diop, a pilot flew his
plane into an area ringed by cliffs and encountered a thunderstorm, the existence of which would have been made known to him
had he used his radio equipment. A court of appeals held that his
conduct showed an "obstinancy [which established] his aware75
ness of the probability of damage.
This objective standard has also shifted the burden of proof in
air crash cases brought in French courts. Where the plaintiff once
had to prove intent to cause the damage, he may now benefit from
a rebuttable presumption akin to res ipsa loquitur in the common
law.76 The courts seem to view certain fact patterns in air crash
cases as egregious enough to establish an inexcusable fault sufficient to erase the limitations of the Warsaw Convention, or to bring
the presumptive fault article L. 321-4 into play. Of course, once the
fault is established, the elements of proof must be certain as regards recovery for individual injuries.7
A final caveat about translation problems must be added to any
analysis of French dealings with the Warsaw Convention. The authentic text of the Convention is in French. The difficulty in reconciling the civil law term of dol with common law concepts of
fault has already been discussed. There are further problems with
the scope of vicarious liability and the general authority of the
official text. Article 25 provides that the carrier is liable for the
wilful misconduct of his "prepos6" acting within the scope of his
employment. While this term has been translated as "servant and
agent" in the English text, in civil law it also includes the independent contractor. The carrier can thus be held liable by French
courts for the acts of persons who are not his agents or servants
73. Verplaetse, supra note 70, at 54.
74. Judgment of June 9, 1966, Cass. civ., [Oct. 11, 1966] Gazette du Palais,
summarized sub nom. Lambert v. Guiron, [1966] Y.B., supra note 72, at 433.
75. Judgment of February 9, 1966, Cour d'appel, Rouen, [1966] Revue Frangais de Droit AMrien 235, summarized sub nom. Mutuelle d'Assurances Mriennes
v. Rioult, [1966] Y.B., supra note 72.

76. Verplaetse, supra note 70, at 54.
77. See Judgment of April 25, 1967, Trib. gr. inst., Grenoble, [1967] Revue
Frangais de Droit Mrien 355, summarized in [1967] Y.B., supra note 72, at 224.
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within the common law meaning. 8 In the case of aircraft charters,
French courts will find that the liability of the contractual carrier
(the charterer) is governed by the Convention because the actual
carrier (the airline) is acting as his "prepos6." Common law jurisdictions will find, however, that only the actual carrier is protected
by the Convention because it is the party exercising the most important functions in the transportation of passengers. 9 The authority of the French text has also been brought into question in
so seemingly small a dispute as whether the word "and" should be
included in a phrase in article 8. In CorocraftLtd. v. PanAmerican
Airways, Inc.,8" the plaintiffs right to recover full value of a lost
parcel depended on whether the English translation of the French
text was correct in requiring three particulars in an air waybill
rather than one. The English courts that decided the case heard
extensive testimony from French attorneys on the meaning of the
text and finally decided that the English insertion of "and" was a
translator's gloss that could not be given preference over the wording of the French phrase. 8 A plaintiff who has relied on the English
text, but who is forced by venue, time, or circumstance to bring
suit on his claim in France, must be prepared to deal with the
French text.
IV.

COMPARATIVE LABrITy LImrrs

A.

The United States

While the question of air carrier liability in French law has developed around standards of tortious conduct, it has been effectively rendered moot in the United States by the Montreal Agreement of 1966. Each carrier joining in the Agreement waived the
right to claim the Warsaw Convention article 20(1) defense. That
article limited liability when the carrier and its agents had taken
all necessary measures to avoid damage to passengers, or when it
was impossible for the carrier and agents to take such measures.
This waiver, coupled with the article 25 liability for wilful misconduct, effectively submits the airlines to absolute liability for pas78. Mankiewicz, supra note 12, at 740.
79. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).

80. [1968] 3 W.L.R. 1273.
81. See Mankiewicz, Conflicting Interpretationsof the Warsaw Air Transport
Treaty, 18 AM. J. Com. L. 177 (1970).
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senger injury.2 In return for the carriers' submission to such stringent liability standards, the Agreement limits recovery for death
or bodily injury to $75,000, including legal fees and costs. The
effect of the Agreement is to protect signatory airlines from a judicial determination by an American court that its conduct in an
accident was so grievous as to remove it from the Warsaw limitation and subject it to an unlimited adverse judgment.
Before the Agreement was implemented, American courts followed a liberal definition of wilful misconduct. In American Airlines v. Ulen,13 the court charged that the standard was met if the
act was intentional with the knowledge that injury would likely
result, and further, was done "with a wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences." 4 The Warsaw Convention was inappli-'
cable, the court held, because the pilot's failure to plan his flight
so as to miss a high mountain that he knew was within his altitude
range was evidence of deliberate and reprehensible action. Soon
after Uen, a New York district court interpreted wilful misconduct
the same way, stating in its charge to the jury that it involved
either deliberate intent to injure or intentional misconduct which
implied willingness to injure or "complete disregard for the natural
consequences of the act."85 The Second Circuit, in Pekelis v.
Transcontinental& Western Air, Inc.,8 upheld a lower court judgment that defined wilful misconduct in four alternative ways,
ranging from intentional commission of an act with knowledge of
probable injury to intentional omission of an act which implied
reckless disregard of the consequences. 7
82.

See Montreal Agreement, para. 1, cited in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 26,

at 434.
83. 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
84. Id. at 533. Note also the carrier's argument re the term "dol".
85. Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, [1949] U.S. Av. REp. 65, 69-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (transcript of jury instructions). The jury held in favor of the

airline. Id. at 71.
.86. 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951).
87. Id. at 124. The judgment for the plaintiff, under the limits of the Warsaw
Convention, was reversed and a new trial ordered. Id. at 131. The charge stated
that wilful misconduct is:

(1) the intentional performance of an act with knowledge that the performance of that act will probably result in injury or damage, or (2) the intentional performance of an act in such a manner as to imply reckless disregard
of probable consequences, or (3) the intentional omission of some act, with
knowledge that such omission will probably result in damage or injury, or

(4) the intentional omission of some act in a manner from which could be
implied reckless disregard of the probable consequences of the omission.
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Beginning in the 1950's, however, American courts began to retrench and take a restrictive view of the conduct necessary to defeat the Warsaw Convention's limited liability provisions. The
New York Supreme Court charged in Froman v. Pan American
Airways, Inc.,8" that the actor must have intended the result that
came about or must have conducted himself "with. knowledge of
what the consequences would be and have gone ahead recklessly
despite his knowledge of those conditions.""9 Two years later, in
1955, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
retreated from its earlier perspective on wilful misconduct and
9 9 The Second Cirapplied a definition much like that in Froman.
cuit also relented that year. In Grey v. American Airlines,9 1 it approved a charge that stated that there "must be a realization of
the probability of injury from the conduct, and a disregard of the
probable consequences." 9 The evidence showed that when the
plane's fourth engine malfunctioned, it caused the plane to swerve
as it started to land. The Captain and First Officer tried conflicting
safety measures in the confusion, and the plane crashed. In affirming the jury's verdict for the defendant, the court of appeals said
that the actions of the crew indicated a sincere attempt to save
both plane and passengers and it was reasonable for the jury to find
that there was no wilful misconduct. Subsequent Second Circuit
decisions reiterated the view that knowledge of the consequences
was required. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines,
Ltd.,93 held that knowledge must be coupled with recklessness, not
offered as an alternative to it. Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World
Airlines,94 decided in the same year, adopted a similar position.
Leroy, it should be noted, concerned the same air crash that was
the basis for Emery v. Sabena, the 1967 case before the Cour de
Cassation. Though the French court had found that the pilot was
unaware of the plane being off course, the Second Circuit thought
Lacey, Recent Developments in the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 385,
391 (1967).
88. [19531 U.S. & CAN. Av. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953) affl'd, 284 App. Div. 935,
135 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1955) (mem.).
89. Id. at 6.
90. Rashap v. American Airlines, [1955] U.S. & CAN. Av. 593 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
91. 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
92. Id. at 285. The Court cited Ulen, supra note 83, and Pekelis, supra note
86, as precedent for its approval. '
93. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).

94. 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
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the facts implied that the crew of the plane deliberately misled the
air controller in Rome who was giving them landing instructions.
The significance of the two decisions, however, lies in the finding
by both courts that the carrier was liable without limit. The
French court used a standard of implied knowledge while the
American court found intentional misconduct, but both bypassed
the Warsaw limits because of the egregious circumstances and
recklessness of the actions.
Even though the Montreal Agreement took the question of liability out of the hands of the jury, American courts have nevertheless
been active in extending carrier liability under the Warsaw Convention. Several recent American opinions, for example, have
dealt with carrier liability for injuries incurred during disembarkation. A passenger injured in a fall in the baggage delivery and
customs area of the terminal was denied recovery in McDonald v.
Air Canada5 because she had reached what the court termed a
"safe point" after leaving the plane. The First Circuit held the carrier's liability ceased when she reached this undefined area, even
though she was still a passenger of the carrier while in the building.
Several later New York cases adopted the "safe point" theory,"6
and in Hernandez v. Air France,9" the First Circuit reaffirmed it.
Recently-landed passengers, who had left the airplane and had
been taken to the terminal one-half mile away, were attacked by
terrorists. The passengers had already presented their passports to
authorities, and were waiting in the main baggage area, a fact that
the court said established their "separation from the aircraft." The
court's holding contravened the decisions of the Second and Third
Circuit Courts of Appeal, where passengers who had been injured
in a similar terrorist attack during a search prerequisite to boarding, had been allowed to recover under article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention." It is significant that one of the primary sources of
95. 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
96. See Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. 17 & 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Klein v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 App. Div. 2d 679, 360
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1974). Neither court, however, defines this point other than to note

that it is reached once the passenger descends from the plane and enters the
terminal. The most recent articulation of this theory can be found in Maugnie v.
Compagnie National Air France, 549 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3807.

97. 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3652.
98.

See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); Day

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
890 (1976). The First Circuit distinguished these cases on the facts presented. 545
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precedent in this narrow question is a 1966 decision by the French
Cour de Cassation where a passenger was denied recovery for an
injury incurred while crossing the "customs garden" to the side of
the airport traffic apron. The Court had concluded that the cus0 9
toms garden did not present "risks inherent" in air transportaion.
B.

England

The question of air carrier liability has not been widely litigated
in England. One of the primary factors cited is the "reversed burden of proof system," i.e., the absolute liability provisions, brought
into play by the Hague Protocol and the Montreal Agreement. '
That the evolving provisions of the Warsaw Convention have been
fully absorbed into English law may have contributed to the lack
of lawsuits. The "Carriage by Air Act of 1932 gave effect to the
original Convention on May 15, 1933.01 The Convention was then
incorporated into domestic law, with certain exceptions, in the
Order of 1952.12 The most notable of these exceptions was that the
carrier could escape liability for the tortious acts of his employees
only if he was not in privity with the employees. Contrary to the
Warsaw provision that all necessary measures had to be taken to
avoid the damage, the carrier and his employees had only to prove
that all reasonable measures had been taken.10° Thus, the common
law rule of vicarious liability was considerably narrowed in English
domestic air transportation cases.
These provisions were rendered obsolete, however, by the Carriage by Air Act of 1961,04 which actually came into force in 1967.15
The Order of 1967 applied the amendments of the Hague Protocol
to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention as enacted in English
law. While the treatment of international air carriage by English
F.2d at 282-84. Accord, Leppo v. Trans World Airlines, 56 App. Div. 2d 813, 392
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1977).
99. Judgment of Jan. 18, 1966, Cass. civ. Ire, France, [1966] Dalloz-Sirey
Sommaires 85, noted as Mache v. Air France, 33 J. AiR L. & CoM. 208 (1967).
100. Martin, Death and Injury in InternationalAir Transport,41 J. Am L. &
CoM. 255, 255-56 (1975). He also cites other factors, including the inclination of
Europeans to settle cases and the respect for the Convention held by the European judiciary.
101. See 1 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 10, at 400.
102. See id. at 465.
103. Id. at 469.
104. 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 27, reprintedin 2 C. SHAWCROSS &K. BEAUMoNT, supra
note 10, app. B at 118.
105. See 2 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 10, app. B, at 118.
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courts changed only to reflect the new liability limits of the Protocol, the status of domestic air carriage changed significantly. The
carrier no longer has to prove lack of privity with his employees.
The 1967 Order also revoked all previous legislation that had
clouded the effect of the Convention in England, and made the
treaty a law with total authority."°8 In effect, the Warsaw Convention now governs every aspect of air transportation in England,
both international and domestic.
English case law on the carrier's loss of Warsaw protection
through wilful misconduct is minimal. The interpretation of
"wilful misconduct" in place of the French "dol" excludes any
form of negligence. In arriving at that interpretation, English
courts relied exclusively upon the English law of railway carriage,
and did not examine the usage of the terms in any other legal
system.' 7 The only English decision defining the term has been
Horabin v. British Overseas Airways Corp."°8 There, in its charge
to the jury, the court stated that wilful misconduct could be established only if it were shown that the pilot knowingly (and in that
sense wilfully) did the wrongful act and that he was aware that it
was a wrongful act during its commission.' The facts showed that
the pilot was unfamiliar with the flight pattern he was to follow,
refused to land in France when given permission, or to fly to an
alternate landing sight, but instead, struck out for southeast England where the weather conditions were bad. The jury found, however, that the pilot had made only a grave error in judgment which
did not amount to wilful misconduct, and the court held for the
defendants.
C.

Germany and the Soviet Union

The Warsaw Convention, as amended by the Hague Protocol,
came into force in the Federal Republic of Germany on August 1,
1963.110 The Warsaw provisions expressly cover international air
carriage; domestic air carriage is govened by the so-called Air Navigation Act of 1959. Liability under this legislation is remarkably
broad. The owner or operator of a plane is absolutely liable for the
injury to or death of any person employed in connection with the
106. See 2 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 10, at 426.

107. Id.
108. [19521 2 All. E.R. 1016.
109. Id. at 1022.
110. LuftVG § 34 in DEUTSCHE

GESETZE (ScHONF LDER) (W.

Ger.).
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aircraft and its operation."' The owner's only defense is the contributory negligence of the victim, but that is difficult to prove. Acts
of God and force majeur are not defenses."12 The carrier's liability
for injury to passengers is the same as that under the Warsaw
Convention. Passengers injured in domestic air transportation may
recover from the carrier whenever the carrier cannot show that he
the damand his employees took all necessary measures to prevent
13
measures.'
such
take
to
impossible
age or that it was
The standard of wilful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention has been likened by the German courts to gross negligence.
Such conduct is defined as total disregard of something which is
clear to an individual in the particular case, or the omission of
obvious and simple considerations. In the case where this definition was formulated, the plaintiff claimed damages in excess of the
Warsaw limits for injury incurred when the plane in which he was
being carried crashed at a Rio de Janeiro airport. The airport
lacked modern facilities and the plane's crew did not speak Portuguese, which caused communications problems with the control
tower. The court held, however, that these events did not constitute gross negligence because the airport was used by all planes
flying in and out of the area and English was widely used in radio
communications with the tower.'
In the Soviet Union, air law is subject primarily to the Air Code
of December 26, 1961, and secondarily to the Warsaw Convention
as amended by the Hague Protocol."' In the event of passenger
injury on a domestic flight, the carrier is liable unless he proves
that the injury resulted from the intentional act of the victim."6
The Air Code extends liability on the theory that air travel is a
source of increased danger and further, omits force majeur as a
circumstance excluding the carrier's liability. The carrier's liability will be limited under international agreements to which the
U.S.S.R. is a party unless the damage occurred as a result of the
intent or gross negligence of the carrier or persons authorized by
him while performing their official duties."' Under the Air Code,
111. LuftVG § 33 in DEUTSCHE GESETZE (SCHONFELDER) (W. Ger.). See also 1
E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW § 332 (2d Ed. 1968); [1967] Y.B., supra note
72, at 92.
112. [1967] Y.B., supra note 72.
113. §§ 44 & 45 LuftVG (W. Ger.).
114. [1967] Y.B., supra note 72, at 229.
115. 1 F. FELDBRUGGE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Sovmr LAW 33 (1973).
116. J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEm LAW 394 (1969).
117. 1 F. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 115, 34-36.
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then, wilful misconduct is interpreted as "intent or gross negligence.""'
V.

CONCLUSION

The most important question governing Warsaw Convention liability is whether the Convention applies at all. First, both the
ticketed state of origin and the ticketed state of destination must
be parties to the Convention. If either state is not an adherent,
then liability is not limited. Second, the injury must come within
the purview of the language of the Convention. If, for example, a
passenger has already disembarked, then the carrier is not liable
for an injury. Third, the status of a state's adherence to the Convention must be determined. If the state has ratified the Hague
Protocol, the liability limit is higher than if the Protocol has not
been ratified. Fourth, the Montreal Agreement must be considered. If the carrier is a party to that Agreement, as all United
States carriers are, then the liability limit is a flat $75,000. For the
states whose treatment of the Warsaw Convention has been discussed, the first consideration is moot because all are parties to the
Convention. A step-by-step delineation of different liability considerations is often lacking, however, in the reported opinions.
Most courts treat Convention adherence and liability as an ironclad rule, seeming to forget that the Convention, no matter what
its treatment in their native country, is neither universally nor
consistently accepted, nor are many of its terms usable within the
context of the modern air industry. These factors are important to
the formulation of decisions affecting policy, such as the assignment of responsibility to protect against terrorism aimed at air
passengers. When a court decides that the carrier should bear the
cost of injury primarily because the thrust of the Warsaw Convention was to allocate that cost in that direction, it overlooks the
simple fact that when the Convention was written no other party
could bear the costs. In 1929, the risk was too great to make the
passenger suffer. The risk and the costs are still considerable in
1977, but perhaps the allocation should no longer be one-sided.
Governmental assistance might be the answer, and the courts
could point that out.
The problem with the wilful misconduct standard could also be
approached more realistically if the policy behind application of
the Convention were considered. Seemingly, article 25 was in118.

Id.
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cluded in the Convention as a sort of safety-valve measure, a "last
clear chance" type doctrine that would assure an unlimited recovery for a badly injured plaintiff. The safety-valve made sense when
air transportation was still largely experimental. It makes little
sense today, now that government regulation and industry innovations have made air travel the safest mode of transportation. Furthermore, the standard has produced much confusion since courts
of different nations interpret it differently. The French recognized
this problem when they redefined dol in 1957. All in all, the standard has proved troublesome and of questionable worth. It is suggested that the wilful misconduct standard be discarded and the
limits raised. The results would be two-fold: uniformity would be
achieved in one area of air carrier liability and the nature of the
industry would be more accurately reflected.
Elizabeth Graeme Browning

